This paper evaluates individuals' ability to avoid investment mistakes and analyzes how investment competence is related to the propensity to seek or rely on professional advice. To address these issues, we use novel survey data collected from a representative sample of Swiss households. We find that investment competence is characterized by significant age and gender gaps, and that individuals who rely less on price movements as a source of information about investments are more likely to show above-the-average investment competence. We also find that individuals with relatively extensive investment experience and those who rely relatively strongly on their own judgment in making investment decisions are more likely to make investment decisions autonomously. In addition, we find that investment competence is positively related to the demand for financial advice. Thus, it appears that the individuals who most need financial advice are those who are least likely to seek such advice and rely on it.
Introduction
A compelling body of research documents that households make serious investment mistakes. Among the various pieces of evidence are findings that households hold under-diversified portfolios (Blume and Friend, 1975; Kelly, 1995; Goetzmann and Kumar, 2008) and exhibit a strong preference for local and home country stocks (Huberman, 2001; Calvet et al., 2007) . In addition, households trade too much (Odean, 1999) , sell winners too early and hold losers too long (Shefrin and Statman, 1985; Odean, 1998) , and they tend to buy a stock simply because it catches their attention (Barber and Odean, 2008) . As a result, the average retail investor tends to underperform the market (Barber et al., 2009 ).
One might argue that an inability to avoid investment mistakes will not necessarily generate poor financial outcomes for households. At least in principle, households with low investment competence could seek help from qualified financial advisors. In fact, the regulation of financial advisors relies, to a large extent, on the assumption that these advisors are mainly consulted by unsophisticated investors in need of help. However, regulatory protective measures can be effective only if households with limited investment competence seek the support of professional advisors. Otherwise, financial advice cannot serve as a substitute for investment competence, and regulatory measures will not benefit those who need them the most.
In this paper, we analyze whether individuals in Switzerland are at risk of making investment mistakes and whether they are inclined to seek help from professional advisors. To assess individuals' competence in avoiding investment mistakes, we conducted an online survey that consisted of questions that address common errors documented in the empirical literature on behavioral and household finance. We analyze the determinants of investment mistakes and assess how an individual's degree of investment competence affects whether he or she makes investment decisions autonomously, consults a professional advisor or delegates investment decisions to a potential advisor. We obtain several interesting findings. We find that respondents differ in their investment competence significantly by their age and gender: younger, female respondents show significantly lower investment competence than the other respondents. We also find that a greater reliance on price movements as a source of information about investments increases the probability that a person shows below-the-average investment competence. We find that individuals with substantial investment experience, who rely strongly on their own judgment, are more likely to make investment decisions autonomously than to seek and rely on advice. However, we also observe that the demand for financial advice is positively related to investment competence: investors who are less able to avoid investment errors are more likely to make investment decisions autonomously, whereas investors with higher investment competence are more likely to delegate decisions to an advisor. Overall, our results suggest that advisory services are not a substitute for the ability to avoid investment mistakes and that supply-side solutions imposed by regulators to protect financial customers may not benefit those who need them the most. their long-term financial security. The question of whether expert financial advice truly benefits retail investors is still under debate, but there is a consensus that financial advice may improve retail investors' portfolio decisions when conflicts of interests are minimized (Bhattacharya et al., 2012) . There is evidence that professionally managed portfolios are better diversified (Gerhardt and Hackethal, 2009 ) and show a weaker disposition effect than portfolios of retail investors (Shapira and Venezia, 2001 ).
To date, the question of whether financial advice is a sufficient remedy for inferior decision-making has focused mainly on widespread financial illiteracy as a source of adverse decisions.
1 One strand of the literature documents a negative relationship between financial literacy and advice seeking, suggesting that those with lower levels of financial literacy are more inclined to make use of financial advice. For example, Hackethal et al. (2010) study the behavior of German retail investors and conclude that customers with less interest in and knowledge about financial matters are more likely than others to rely on advice. In a portfolio-choice experiment, Hung and Yoong (2010) find that individuals with low financial literacy (both self-assessed and measured) choose to take advice more often than others do. Frederick (2005) shows that individuals with lower levels of cognitive skills are more risk-averse, and both Bluethgen et al. (2008) and Gerhardt and Hackethal (2009) find that greater risk aversion increases the demand for financial advice. Kramer (2012) finds that banking clients who view themselves as less financially literate than others are more likely to ask for expert financial assistance. Additionally, Hackethal et al. (2010) find that less sophisticated customers are less aware of the problem of conflicts of interest among financial advisors and therefore are more inclined to consult and follow the advice of advisors. Hence, financial advice can serve as a substitute for a perceived or measured lack of financial sophistication.
Other studies, however, suggest exactly the opposite relationship between investment competence and the demand for financial advice, arguing that more sophisticated individuals are more likely to seek advice.
One possible reason for this variation may be the incentives of advisors to reveal information to investors with different levels of sophistication. For example, Collins (2010) , Calcagno and Monticone (2011) and Bucher-Koenen and Koenen (2011) suggest that advisors reveal information only to more knowledgeable clients, anticipating that such clients are more likely to consult advisors. Another possible reason for a positive relationship between financial sophistication and advice seeking may be the marginal costs of information acquisition and processing. If time spent with an advisor is perceived as a fixed cost, then highly sophisticated investors will face lower marginal costs of information processing than will investors with less sophistication, which will motivate the sophisticated investors to consume more advisory services (Bluethgen et al., 2008) .
Various studies have confirmed the marginal benefits argument using different measures of investor sophistication. Lusardi and Mitchell (2006) find that people with higher scores on financial literacy questions are more likely than less sophisticated investors to rely on financial experts when planning their 1 Kramer (2012) , in addition, considers cognitive ability but fails to find a significant effect on advice seeking.
retirement. Using past portfolio performance as a proxy for financial sophistication, Bluethgen et al. (2008) find that wealthier, more sophisticated and more experienced clients are more likely to seek advice. Hackethal et al. (2012) confirm the effect of investment experience and wealth on the propensity to seek advice and suggest that the effect could also be related to the higher opportunity costs associated with time among wealthier, more experienced investors. Further support for the conjecture that less sophisticated individuals rely less on expert financial advice than others can be found in the psychology literature. Kruger and Dunning (1999) , for example, observe that incompetence robs people of awareness of their own incompetence because such individuals lack the capacity to distinguish appropriate decisions from errors. As a result, such individuals fail to seek better information.
Data Description

The Sample
Our dataset comes from an online survey that was conducted in attempts to manage their savings for retirement may be high. Third, the multicultural character of Switzerland makes it possible to examine a magnitude of cultural effects on households' investment decision behavior, advice seeking and delegation.
The participants in our survey were recruited from a pool of individuals provided by a professional market research agency in Switzerland. The agency has experience conducting surveys on financial topics. The participants were informed of the purpose of the study and of the affiliation of the authors.
Additionally, in exchange for their participation, the individuals answering most of the questions took part in a raffle in which an iPad was awarded to the winner. 4 The questions were originally written in German. We used professional interpreters who were provided by the market research agency to translate the questions into French and Italian.
The sample is representative of the underlying population in terms of age, gender and geographic location. As Table 1 shows, the respondents were 48 years old on average. 54% were male, 30% had degrees from schools of applied sciences ("Hochschule") and 18% had university degrees. Overall, 43%
of the respondents stated that their annual disposable income was between 50,000 and 100,000 Swiss francs (USD 48,500 and USD 97,000 as of December 2010); 5 only 9% stated their annual income as less than 50,000 Swiss francs. Notably, 37% estimated the value of their wealth (including savings and financial investments) to be above 100,000 Swiss francs. 
Assessing Investment Competence
The main body of the survey contains questions that aim to evaluate individuals' ability to avoid investment mistakes. An investment mistake is a decision that is not recommended or wise based on theoretical or empirical considerations. We refer to the ability to avoid investment mistakes as investment competence.
Generally, investment mistakes can result from a lack of specific knowledge or an inability to apply such knowledge effectively. For example, Dhar and Zhu (2006) find that individuals with better financial literacy are more likely to avoid suboptimal portfolio decisions, such as those associated with the disposition effect. The inability to apply knowledge effectively can be driven by emotions or cognitive errors in the selection and processing of information, as suggested by the vast body of research on behavioral biases (see, for example, the surveys cited above).
To evaluate the investment competence of the respondents, we invited them to answer a set of multiplechoice questions whose potential answers were designed to illustrate biased decision behavior. Because we provided multiple answers, the respondents were able to compare them and choose the best alternative. The participants could also skip questions or choose the "don't know" option. The appendix provides an English version of the investment competence questions and their motivation. Table 2 shows how the participants answered our investment competence questions, the percentage of participants who answered the questions incorrectly and the distribution of the incorrect answers. The respondents made the most errors in recalling and comparing the past returns of asset classes (Q1), deciding how many assets are needed for diversification (Q4) and assessing the attractiveness of assets with large but unlikely payoffs (Q8). Participants made the fewest mistakes in deciding whether to take risks after losses (Q9), judging the probability of losses from long-term investments (Q5) and comparing the importance of different performance drivers (Q3). Overall, 50% of the participants answered between four and five questions incorrectly, 0.4% (4 individuals) made no mistakes and 0.9% (8 individuals)
answered 9 of 11 questions incorrectly, providing the highest number of incorrect answers in the group.
Notably, 9% failed to answer at least one question.
Investment mistakes themselves are only weakly correlated across individuals (see Table 3 ). The only exception is indicated by the answers to the last two questions, which were designed to assess the disposition effect, i.e., the propensity to hold losers too long (Q10) and sell winners too early (Q11). One method of measuring an individual's overall ability to avoid investment mistakes involves computing the fraction of incorrect answers. However, the disadvantage of this approach is that each question receives the same weight even though the degree of discrepancy between the incorrect and correct answers differs from question to question (see Table 2 ). Essentially, the questions may differ in their difficulty levels and in their degree of precision. For this reason, we developed a measure based on a weighting scheme that considers both issues. 6 We define the index of investment competence for individual ! as a weighted sum of investment mistakes, i.e.
where
0 otherwise ! and 0 ≤ ! ! ≤ 1 is a weight that reflects the difficulty respectively the precision of question !. The weight of question ! is defined as
The weighting scheme is the first step of the PRIDIT scoring method devised by Brockett et al. (2002) , who use it to assess insurance fraud based on several indicator variables. In the second step, a principle component analysis is used to analyze the rescaled responses. Lusardi et al. (2012) used this method to assess financial literacy among the elderly in the U.S. We do not employ the second step because the responses to our investment competence questions show little correlation (see Table 3 ). 7 "Don't know" answers are treated as no mistakes.
where ! . is the mean or the percentage of participants who answer question ! incorrectly. The weight ! ! applies a higher (lower) penalty to a question when a larger proportion of the participants answered the question correctly (incorrectly).
Investment Competence Drivers
The literature on the cross-sectional relationship between investment mistakes and household characteristics suggests that households with greater financial wealth, better education and more investment experience tend to make fewer investment errors (Goetzmann and Kumar, 2008; Calvet et al., 2007; Calvet et al., 2007; Dhar and Zhu, 2006; Feng and Seasholes, 2005; Calvet et al., 2009 ). Our proxy for financial experience is self-assessed investment experience. We asked the participants to evaluate their own investment experience in five asset classes (Swiss bonds, Swiss equities, international equities, international bonds and alternative investments) on a scale with four levels. Table 1 provides the summary statistics. The participants in our sample show the most experience with Swiss equities and Swiss bonds and the least experience with non-Swiss bonds and non-Swiss equities.
In Table 4 , we report the polychoric correlations between the participants' levels of experience in different asset classes. 8 We observe a high correlation between experience with Swiss bonds and international bonds and between experience with Swiss equities and international equities. Participants who indicate high (low) levels of experience with international equities are also more likely to have high (low) levels of experience with alternative investments. To determine the correlations between investment experience and different asset classes, we use principle component analysis to build an index of investment experience. 9 The standardized loadings of the variables based on their correlation matrix are provided in Table 5 . 10 With the first principle component used to measure investment experience, we can explain 70% of the variance in the variables. The
Cronbach's Alpha is 0.89, which indicates the high reliability of the variables used. Furthermore, we hypothesize relationships between an individual's views about the importance of specific sources of information and the probability of two decision types: making certain types of investment mistakes and seeking financial advice. To assess these relationships, we ask the participants to judge the importance of the following information sources on a three-point scale that includes the categories "not important," "important" and "very important": price movements, news in the media, own judgment, opinions of friends, opinions of one's advisor and opinions of many advisors. For the participants in our sample, the most important source of information was one's own opinions, followed by price movements and the opinions of one's advisor (see Table 1 ). The correlation between the perceived importance of various information sources is low (0.01) to mediocre (0.55) (see Table 6 ). For this reason, we do not apply further transformations to these data. 
Demand for Financial Advice
Financial advisors can be endowed with decision-making authority or can play a purely advisory role.
Swiss banks offer both options only to wealthy individuals 11 , but some independent advisors offer advisory services to less wealthy individuals as well. Because participants may not have an advisor, we ask that they consider a potential financial advisor (at a bank or not) and then choose the option that best describes their current attitude toward acquiring and relying on advice from such an advisor. The distribution of answers is summarized in Table 7 . 22% of the participants state that they prefer to make investment decisions autonomously, 60% would consult one or several advisors before they decide, and 15% would rely largely or completely on an advisor. Calcagno and Monticone (2011) asked a similar question of banking clients in Italy in 2007. Of the clients who participated in the survey, 12% indicated that they make their decisions autonomously.
The higher percentage of self-directed individuals in our sample (22%) could be a function of the participants' age. In our sample, 56% of the participants are less than 50 years old, whereas the percentage of banking clients under 50 in the sample of Calcagno and Monticone (2011) is 38%. Some studies provide evidence that younger individuals are more likely to make investment decisions autonomously (Bluethgen et al., 2008; Hackethal et al., 2010; Kelly, 1995; Bhattacharya et al., 2012) . The results that we report in Section 4.2 support this finding.
To avoid estimation difficulties that can result from the use of too few observations in a given category, we pool participants who are willing to delegate all decisions (d 5 ) with those who are willing to delegate most decisions (d 4 ). As a result, we obtain a dependent variable with four categories (d 1 , d 2 , d 3 and d 4 ).
Advice Seeking and Individuals' Characteristics
Most studies on advice seeking find that the demand for advisory services increases with wealth (Bluethgen et al., 2008; Guiso and Jappelli, 2006; Calcagno and Monticone, 2011; Bluethgen et al., 2008; Bhattacharya et al., 2012) . Some studies also find that older individuals are also significantly more likely to seek advice than are younger individuals (Bluethgen et al., 2008; Hackethal et al., 2010; Kelly, 1995; Bhattacharya et al., 2012) . The effect of gender and those of experience, self-employment and education as proxies for the opportunity cost of time, are ambiguous. 12 Based on these findings, we include the following variables as controls in the multivariate analysis: age, gender, education level, income, wealth, investment experience, and self-employment status. Additionally, we control for cultural differences based on the linguistic regions of the participants.
Results
Drivers of Investment Mistakes
In this section, we analyze whether the probability of certain investment mistakes and a person's level of investment competence are related to the perceived importance of specific information sources, stated investment experience and various demographic and socio-economic variables. Table 8 reports the marginal effects of logistic regressions on the probability of observing specific investment errors where investment errors are represented by the binomial variables ! ! for ! = 1, … ,11.
12 Whereas Guiso and Jappelli (2006), Calcagno and Monticone (2011), Bluethgen et al. (2008) , Hackethal et al. (2012) and Kelly (1995) find that males have a lower propensity to delegate, Bhattacharya et al. (2012) find that males are more likely to obtain advice, and Hackethal et al. (2010) find that males and females do not differ significantly in their willingness to rely on advice. Additionally, Hackethal et al. (2012) find that advised clients are more likely to be self-employed and tend to be more experienced. However, Calcagno and Monticone (2011) find that experience does not significantly influence advice seeking, and Kramer (2012) does not find any significant effect of self-employment on the demand for financial advice among Dutch retail clients. Elmerick et al. (2002) find that for US households, self-employment is negatively related to the likelihood of using a financial planner in saving and investment decisions. They also find that this likelihood increases with educational achievement. However, Calcagno and Monticone (2011) and Hackethal et al. (2010) find that better-educated investors are less likely to delegate and are more likely to make investment decisions on their own. As expected, reliance on certain information sources significantly influences the risk of certain investment mistakes. We find that individuals who strongly rely on price movements as a source of information are more likely than others to trade on a random walk and to fall victim to the disposition effect. Individuals who follow media news are more likely to be informed about the past long-term returns of different asset classes. However, they are also at a greater risk of trading actively on a random walk. Individuals who rely on their friends' opinions are more likely to hold only a few assets, whereas for individuals who rely on their own judgment, the opposite is the case. Individuals who strongly weight the opinion of their own advisors are more likely to be aware of the risks of assets in the short term and of the advantages of portfolio and time diversification. However, they are also more vulnerable to the disposition effect. Hence, it is possible that individuals who rely on advisors learn to avoid some mistakes related to asset allocation but do not learn how to avoid mistakes in shifting their asset allocations over time.
Individuals with higher self-reported levels of investment experience are indeed better than others at avoiding investment mistakes. More experienced individuals appear to be more familiar with the past returns of asset classes, show better knowledge about diversification, seem to avoid active trading in the presence of a random walk and show a better ability to avoid the disposition effect. However, they are also more likely to maintain investments for the wrong reasons and to bet on large but unlikely outcomes.
The effects of demographic and socio-economic characteristics on the probability of specific investment errors are also worth noting, as some of these characteristics are often used as proxies for investor sophistication. We find that older individuals make more mistakes in answering questions about the riskreturn profiles of asset classes and diversification but that they are better informed than other respondents about potential performance drivers. The former group of respondents is also less likely to trade actively in the presence of a random walk, less likely to take risks after losses to try to break even and better able to avoid the disposition effect. Females are generally better than males at assessing the short-term risks associated with specific asset classes. However, they are also more likely to trade actively in the presence of a random walk, to maintain investments for the wrong reasons and to fall victim to the disposition effect. Individuals with higher education levels are less likely to maintain investments for the wrong reasons, but otherwise, higher education does not influence the probability of specific investment errors.
The impact of income and wealth on the ability to avoid specific mistakes is limited. Interestingly, we observe significant regional differences; e.g., in answering many questions, French-and Italian-speaking individuals are more likely to make mistakes than are German-speaking individuals.
Although we do not know whether individuals would truly behave as they indicated in their answers to our hypothetical questions, there are some similarities between our observations and the results of other studies of individuals' actual trading behavior. Most often, these studies focus on the disposition effect and under-diversification. Regarding the disposition effect, we observe that younger, less experienced, female individuals, who rely strongly on price movements as a source of information, are more likely than others to fall victim to the disposition effect. Our findings regarding the effects of age and gender are consistent with the results of Cheng et al. (2013) , who used data on investors in the Taiwan Futures Exchange. Our findings on the relevance of investment experience are consistent with the results of Dhar and Zhu (2006) . Those researchers observe that investors who gain more investment experience through frequent trading are less vulnerable to the disposition effect. In comparing experienced investors and undergraduates students, Costa et al. (2013) find that both groups are subject to the disposition effect but that the experienced investors are less so. The relevance of price movements is indirectly observed by Weber and Camerer (1998) . In an experimental study, Weber and Camerer find that individuals who make portfolio decisions that conform to the disposition effect ask for information about past price movements even though they have been told that price changes are independent over time.
In investigating the drivers of under-diversification, we find that older individuals are more likely to state that fewer than ten securities are sufficient to minimize portfolio risk. To the extent that a lack of knowledge drives under-diversification, we expect older individuals to hold less diversified portfolios. Calvet et al. (2009) study the portfolios of the entire Swedish population and find that older households are more likely to hold under-diversified portfolios. Furthermore, we observe that individuals who selfidentify as having more extensive investment experience are more likely than others to know that welldiversified portfolios consist of more than ten stocks. In applying this knowledge, experienced investors should develop better-diversified portfolios than less experienced investors. This conjecture is consistent with the results of Goetzmann and Kumar (2008) , who find that more sophisticated investors, i.e., more experienced investors, are better diversified.
To consolidate our results on the drivers of investment mistakes, we use the index of investment competence as a dependent variable and estimate whether its value is related to the perceived importance of information sources, investment experience and certain demographic and socio-economic characteristics. The results are summarized in Table 9 . Panel A reports the mean value of variables in a sample with individuals with an investment competence below the average and in another sample with individuals with investment competence above the average. It includes p-values on one-side t-tests on the reported differences in the means. Panel B reports estimated marginal effects of three regressions. The first column of Panel B reports the marginal effects of a logistic regression on the probability to show high investment competence (investment competence that is above the average). The second and third columns report the marginal effects of OLS regressions on the index of investment mistakes using the whole sample respectively a subsample with one-person households. The explanatory variables are described in the appendix. Robust standard errors are given in parenthesis. Significance levels are denoted with stars: *** p≤0.01 ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.1. In Panel A, we present the differences between individuals with high and low investment competence in terms of how they weight the importance of different information sources, their indicated investment experience and some demographic and socio-economic characteristics. One-tailed two-sample t-tests are used to estimate the significance of the observed differences in the means. We find that individuals with lower investment competence consider price movements and friends' recommendations to be significantly more important, on average, than do other individuals. These individuals are also likely to be young, French-or Italian-speaking and female and tend to have less education, income and wealth than other individuals.
To estimate the impact of these variables on investment competence, we first conduct a logistic regression with a binomial variable that takes a value of 1 if investment competence is above average and a value of 0 otherwise. The marginal effects on the probability of above-average investment competence as reported in the first column of Panel B show that older, male individuals and individuals who give relatively less weight to price movements are more likely than others to avoid making many investment mistakes.
We also find that investment competence is characterized by significant age and gender gaps. 
Investment Competence and Advice-Seeking
In this section, while controlling for other relevant variables, we analyze the relationship between individuals' investment competence and their propensity to make investment decisions autonomously, consult advisors and delegate decisions. Panel A of Table 10 shows the differences in the characteristics of individuals with differing degrees of willingness to delegate decisions. Panel B reports the marginal effects of partially proportional odds estimates on the probability of a person's choosing one of the four delegation options.
13
13 The estimation procedure is described in the appendix. We observe that on average, self-directed individuals have the lowest investment competence, whereas individuals who delegate decisions have the highest investment competence. The estimation results confirm this observation. The results show that investment competence positively influences the demand for financial advice. When investment competence increases, the probability of consulting several advisors and of delegating decisions increases, and the probability of making investment decisions autonomously and of consulting an advisor before making a final decision decreases.
14 Other interesting observations emerge from a comparison of the effects of different information sources.
Individuals who rely strongly on the opinions of friends are more likely to consult several advisors, and those who rely less on their friends' opinions are more likely to make investment decisions autonomously or to consult an advisor before making a decision. One's own judgment as a source of information is important only with respect to whether one makes investment decisions autonomously or delegates such decisions. The greater (weaker) one's reliance on one's own judgment, the higher (lower) the probability that one will make one's investment decisions autonomously (delegate decisions). Greater reliance on the opinions of one's advisor increases the probability of a person's consulting an advisor and delegating decisions and decreases the probability of that person's making investment decisions autonomously and of seeking out many advisors. Investment experience increases the probability of a person's making investment decisions autonomously and consulting an advisor before making investment decisions and decreases the probability of that person's consulting with several advisors and delegating decisions.
In summary, self-directed individuals are more likely to be younger, have lower levels of investment competence, have greater investment experience and rely more on their own judgment and less on the opinions of their advisors and friends. Individuals who rely more on the opinions of advisors are more likely to consult an advisor before making an investment decision. Older individuals rely more on the advice of their friends and less on that of a single advisor, and they tend to have high investment competence but low investment experience. They are also more likely to seek the advice of several advisors. The probability of delegating decisions increases with investment competence, reliance on one's own advisor and age. It decreases with stated investment experience and reliance on one's own judgment.
Gender, higher education, self-employment status, income and financial wealth appear to be unrelated to decisions to seek financial advice or to delegate financial decisions.
Why, then, do some individuals with low investment competence make investment decisions autonomously? One reason may be their lack of self-awareness. As Kruger and Dunning (1999) suggest, less competent individuals are likely to lack the ability to recognize their own lack of competence. If awareness is reflected in reliance on one's own judgment, then it appears that individuals with low investment competence tend to be unaware of their incompetence, as individuals with high and low investment competence rely equally strongly on their own judgment (see Table 9 ).
An alternative explanation relates to regret aversion. For a regret-averse decision-maker, consulting an advisor or delegating decisions is risky because the advisor could reveal mistakes in the individual's previous decisions. Such regret tends to be stronger for individuals who are more involved in the decision-making process (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982) . If we proxy involvement in the decisionmaking process using the perceived importance of one's own judgment as a source of information, we may conclude that self-directed individuals are most likely to feel regret because they rely most heavily on their own judgments (see Table 10 ).
The same arguments can explain why advice seeking increases with investment competence. Individuals with higher levels of investment competence may also lack awareness of their abilities but may be less prone to regret in delegating decision because they are less involved in their investment decisions than are self-directed individuals. Additionally, it is possible that more competent individuals anticipate advisors' incentives to reveal information, as suggested by Collins (2010) , Calcagno and Monticone (2011) and Bucher-Koenen and Koenen (2011) , or that they consume more advisory services because of their lower marginal costs of information processing (Bluethgen et al., 2008) .
Learning from Advisors
The fact that individuals with higher investment competence are more likely to consult with advisors and delegate decisions does not necessarily indicate the direction of causality within that relationship.
Individuals with higher levels of investment competence may consult with advisors to learn from them rather than to rely on their advisors' recommendations.
To shed light on this issue, we focus on individuals who are likely to learn from their advisors. We consider two sub-samples: one that includes all individuals who do not make investment decisions autonomously (i.e., those who consult one or several advisors or who delegate decisions) and one that includes all individuals who consult one or several advisors. We then test whether investment competence is related to the perceived importance of advisors' recommendations given the assumption that individuals who learn from their advisors attach greater importance to their advisors' recommendations than do individuals who do not. The results are summarized in Table 11 . The table reports marginal effects of OLS-regressions on the level of investment competence with a subsample of individuals consulting one or several advisors and a subsample of individuals with individuals choosing to consult one or several advisors or delegate decisions. The explanatory variables are described in the appendix. The explanatory variables are described in the appendix. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
Significance levels are denoted with stars: *** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.1. We do not find that individuals' investment competence is related to their reliance on their advisors in any of the subsamples. There is also no evidence that individuals learn from advisors but they tend to attribute the positive achievements resulting from this learning to their own ability. The relationship between the perceived importance of one's own opinion and one's level of investment competence is very weak and is statistically insignificant. We conclude that learning from advisors is most likely not related to the observed positive relationship between investment competence and delegation.
As discussed in Section 3.2, our index of investment competence is constructed using the weighted sums of investment mistakes. A higher (lower) penalty is assigned for an incorrect answer when a larger proportion of the respondents answer the question correctly (incorrectly).
As a robustness check, we estimate the relationship between investment competence and the propensity to seek and rely on advice under alternative specifications for the investment competence index. The first index of investment competence uses the sums of the respondents' investment mistakes. The next two indices introduce weights for some questions to account for their relatively high correlations with other questions. Table 12 reports these estimation results, which show that the effect of investment incompetence remains qualitatively unchanged. The table reports the marginal effect of alternative investment competence indices on the probability to choose one of the options regarding delegation in generalized logit regressions. The repressors (not reported here) are the same as in Table 10 . Robust standards errors are included in parenthesis. Significance levels are denoted with stars: *** p≤0.01 ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.1. The indices are specified as follows:
Investment competence index ( One might argue that for individuals with low investment competence, autonomous investment decisions are not costly because such individuals do not participate in the financial markets, and thus, their investment mistakes appear only "on paper." To test this conjecture, we use stated investment experience as a proxy for participation in the financial markets and re-estimate the impact of investment competence on advice seeking by excluding all individuals without investment experience. Table 13 reports the marginal effects of investment competence on the probability of choosing one of the delegation options within this particular subsample. Clearly, the effects of investment competence and of the control variables on the probability of delegating decisions are qualitatively the same as in the full sample. We conclude that if individuals do not learn from their experience, the "paper mistakes" that they make when answering our questions are likely to materialize in the real world unless they delegate their decisions. The table reports marginal effects on the probability to choose one of the options regarding delegation in a generalized logit regression on a subsample excluding individuals stating no investment experience with any asset class. The explanatory variables are described in the appendix. Robust standards errors are included in parenthesis. Significance levels are denoted with stars: *** p≤0.01 ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.1. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we assess the extent to which individuals in Switzerland are at risk of making investment mistakes and the likelihood that investors will seek help from professional advisors. We find that younger, female individuals show significantly less ability to avoid investment mistakes than do other individuals and that individuals who rely less on price movements as a source of information about investments are more likely than others to avoid making many mistakes simultaneously. Regarding the demand for financial advice, we find that individuals with lower investment competence but a higher stated level of investment experience and a stronger reliance on their own judgment are more likely than others to make investments decisions autonomously. This result is robust to alternative specifications of investment competence and to the use of subsamples that exclude individuals who are unlikely to participate in financial markets. It thus appears that the individuals who are most in need of financial advice are those who are least likely to seek it out and rely on it.
This finding has important implications for initiatives that are intended to promote investment competence among retail investors. Our results suggest that, in Switzerland, younger, Italian-speaking and female individuals would benefit most from such programs. The gender gap with regard to investment competence appears to be a result of the low level of involvement of women in investment decision-making. Hence, specific measures should be used to promote investment competence among women. Our results also suggest that such programs need to clarify the relevance of information about price movements, as we find that individuals who rely less on such information are more likely than others to avoid making many investment mistakes simultaneously.
Overall, this study indicates that it is difficult for financial advisors to reach the people who most need financial advice. On the other hand, letting self-directed individuals learn "by doing" may not be effective, as some mistakes are not easy to identify (Koestner et al., 2012) . Learning by doing in this context is also irrational, as people tend to overweight their own experience relative to broader patterns of evidence. Hence, if the aim is to develop methods of correcting widespread investment mistakes among individuals, additional research should be undertaken to cultivate a better understanding of the conditions under which people learn from their mistakes, determine the limits of their abilities and thus seek professional help. 
Description of Variables
Questions' Background
The first two questions are designed to assess the risk-reward perceptions of households. These questions ask households to compare asset classes in terms of long-term returns and short-term risk. Incorrect answers to these questions may be linked to the availability heuristic .
Because recent returns and losses are easily remembered, these may dominate overall risk-reward perceptions, with adverse consequences for trading decisions. For example, observing assets that have appreciated in the recent past may suggest that such assets are good long-term investments. On the other hand, investing in an asset with long-term return potential without awareness of its potential for shortterm losses increases a person's risk of abandoning it too early.
The availability heuristic may also impact the perceived importance of performance drivers (Question 3).
Because news media typically report the successes or failures of single securities and highlight shifts in the attractiveness of different asset classes, households may overweight such short-term phenomena in long-term asset allocation. However, Griffin and Xu (2009) suggest that even professional hedge fund managers may not exhibit superior skill at timing the market and selecting individual securities.
Question 4 is used to evaluate households' knowledge about the number of stocks that is necessary to achieve good portfolio diversification. A lack of such knowledge may explain why individuals hold under-diversified portfolios.
Question 5 is used to assess households' perception of the risk of long-term investments with returns following a random walk based on their knowledge of time diversification. If households know that the probability of loss decreases with the time horizon of an investment, then high turnover is most likely driven by other factors than knowledge (e.g., overconfidence).
Question 6 addresses a type of trading behavior that is known as probability matching (see Vulkan, 2000 for a review). The question assesses whether, given a random walk with positive drift, individuals prefer an active trading strategy to a passive buy-and-hold strategy.
Question 7 is used to evaluate reasons for maintaining an investment. From a portfolio perspective, holding a stock that has appreciated in market value or has followed a positive trend is equivalent to taking on more risk. Depending on the investment idea, such risk-taking behavior can be optimal.
However, holding an asset because it has appreciated in value or because it has exhibited a positive trend can be suboptimal. For example, holding an asset because its value has increased can be linked to selfattribution bias (Kukla, 1972) . Under this bias, past gains are perceived as evidence of the validity of one's decision to buy the asset, whereas past losses are seen as resulting from bad luck. Due to the representativeness heuristic , households may follow trends. Although momentum investing is considered a legitimate strategy in the practitioner literature, evidence suggests that individual investors who buy equities that have recently outperformed the market and expect that this momentum will continue tend to obtain significantly inferior results (Pettengill et al., 2006) .
Under the assumption that households are risk averse, Question 8 is used to evaluate whether households overweight small probabilities (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) , showing a preference for investing in assets with potentially high but unlikely gains over investing in other assets with the same expected returns.
Question 9 is used to assess households' awareness of their budget constraints in taking additional risks after losses in an effort to break even. The last two questions are used to assess households' tendency to sell winners and hold losers in accordance with the disposition effect.
